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IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS ON THE BANKING SECTOR
Climate change and the need to implement measures to 
move towards a more sustainable economy pose risks 
to the banking sector. Some stem from the materialisation 
of physical risks associated with extreme climate conditions, 
such as rising sea levels and water stress in certain areas. 
Another set of risks is associated with the transition to a 
more sustainable economy, since the implementation of 
measures to prevent or mitigate climate change would 
entail significant changes to human and economic activity. 
These two types of risks could materialise simultaneously, 
as risk mitigation measures may be late or insufficient. In 
both cases, assessing their impact requires the use of 
quantitative tools. 
This box summarises the first work undertaken by the 
Banco de España to quantify the impact of transition risks 
on the banking sector using analytical models. The results 
should be viewed with caution, as only part of the channels 
are modelled, with a methodology that captures just some 
of the adjustment costs. In addition, the box presents a 
more exploratory study of the potential long-term impact 
of physical risks on credit risk, comparing them with 
transition risks, using scenarios from the Network for 
Greening the Financial System (NGFS). This allows an 
assessment to be made of the advantages of taking action 
now to prevent climate change and avoid the costs that 
would arise if the physical risks materialise.
The scenarios used in this first analysis to assess the 
impact of climate change-related transition risks were 
prepared using the Carbon Tax Sectoral (CATS) model.1 
This is a general equilibrium model with a very detailed 
sectoral structure (51 non-energy and two energy sectors), 
designed to capture the impact of an increase in the cost 
of greenhouse gas emissions. The calibration of the model 
replicates the main characteristics of the Spanish economy 
in terms of productive structure, energy intensity, emissions 
by type of technology, etc. 
With this model, simulations were carried out to assess the 
impact on the Spanish economy of four different shocks: 
1) an increase in the price of emission allowances (from 
€25 to €100 per tonne of CO2 equivalent); 2) an extension 
of the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) to all firms, 
including those currently excluded for belonging to the 
so-called non-ETS sectors; 3) a combination of the two 
foregoing measures; and, additionally, 4) the extension of 
the ETS to also include emissions generated directly by 
households. The baseline scenario used to study the 
implementation of these measures considers an economic 
trend in Spain that is analogous to that prior to the 
COVID-19 crisis. 
According to the results of the model, the effect of these 
shocks on economic activity in aggregate terms would be 
noticeable but not huge (see Table 1). However, there are 
a number of reasons why these effects might constitute a 
1	 See	P.	Aguilar,	B.	González	and	S.	Hurtado	(2021),	“Carbon	Tax	Sectoral	Model	(CATS):	a	sectoral	model	for	climate	change	stress	test	scenarios”,	
Occasional Paper, Banco	de	España	(forthcoming).
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The lower bound of the range of impact on sectoral GVA under each scenario is the most negative difference between the accumulated rates of 
change over the three years of the exercise and the corresponding measures under the baseline scenario. The upper bound represents the analogous 
most positive difference. The scenarios 1) increase in the price of emission allowances; 2) extension of the ETS coverage; 3) combination (of the two 
shocks); and 4) combination including extension to households, correspond to those described in the text with the same numbering.
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Table 1
Differences in accumulated rates of change (t+1, t+2, t+3) vis-à-vis the baseline scenario 




IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS ON THE BANKING SECTOR (cont’d)
lower bound. First, reallocating resources between 
sectors, as envisaged by the model, could be difficult in 
practice because of, for example, the high specialisation 
of human capital. In addition, the model does not consider 
the reallocation of physical capital, meaning that 
technological obsolescence costs are excluded by 
construction. 
Second, the model treats households homogeneously, 
underestimating the costs of climate change, as its impact 
is greater on lower-income families. Moreover, in the model 
the Spanish economy is not open to external trade. Thus, 
it only captures climate change effects through domestic 
demand, while those stemming from lower external 
demand are not considered. Lastly, the simulations are 
conducted under the assumption that the rise in energy 
prices in the scenarios is insufficient to cause permanent 
increases in inflation that are passed through to interest 
rates or that translate into sharp financial market 
corrections or significant shocks to house prices. A 
stronger influence of these nominal factors could generate 
more adverse scenarios.
Despite these limitations, the model’s detailed sectoral 
structure makes it possible to identify some sectors where 
this shock has a greater impact. The clearest example is 
energy sectors, whose value added is substantially reduced. 
But the effects also extend not only to the more directly 
affected non-energy sectors (e.g. the chemical sector) but 
even to those most closely related to them via their 
purchases (e.g. the manufacture of machinery and 
equipment) or sales (e.g. the waste treatment sector). 
Through these mechanisms, under the more severe 
scenarios, the sectors most exposed to such shocks would 
be significantly impacted, directly or indirectly (see Chart 1).
To model the impact of these scenarios on the banking 
sector, a framework of comparable granularity for 
measuring corporate default risk is needed.2 That is why 
sectoral granularity has been increased in the probability 
of default (PD) projection of the Forward Looking Exercise 
on Spanish Banks (FLESB) model used for stress testing. 
These sectoral PDs (50 sectors) vary according to the size 
of the firm and sector-specific and aggregate economic 
and financial variables.3



























EFFECT ON THREE-YEAR SECTORAL GVA GROWTH OF THE INCREASE IN THE EMISSIONS PRICE AND THE EXTENSION OF THE SCHEME TO ALL FIRMS AND HOUSEHOLDS 
IN THE TEN MOST AFFECTED SECTORS
Differences, in pp, in the accumulated change in t+1, t+2 and t+3 vis-à-vis the baseline scenario.




IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS ON THE BANKING SECTOR (cont’d)
It should be noted that this framework captures transition 
scenarios’ sectoral heterogeneity in two ways: i) by including 
economic and financial variables in all models, and ii) by 
constructing separate models by sector and size, providing 
different elasticities whenever the available information so 
allows.4 Considering sectoral financial ratios makes it 
possible to analyse PD sensitivity to firms’ hypothetical 
responses aimed at reducing their emissions (e.g. increasing 
borrowing to acquire new, greener technologies).
The impact on PDs of the transition scenarios varies 
among sectors. It is summarised in Chart 2, which presents 
a scatter plot, with each point representing a sector, 
showing the differences in GVA growth (three-year average, 
X axis) and in PD (average for 2021-2023, Y axis) between 
different scenarios and the baseline scenario. Specifically, 
the left-hand panel shows these differences for the 
emissions price increase scenario, while the right-hand 
panel depicts those for the scenario that also envisages 
extending ETS coverage to all firms and households 
(severest scenario). As is to be expected, the sectors hit 
hardest by the climate transition (those with the largest 
falls in GVA vis-à-vis the baseline scenario) tend to present 
higher PD increases. 
As shown in Chart 3, these higher probabilities of default 
would impact cumulative bank profitability. To illustrate this 
impact, the ratio of accumulated profit after tax divided by the 
volume of average risk-weighted assets (RWAs), both as 




SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Each point on the chart relates to a sector of business activity in accordance with the Spanish National Classification of Economic Activities and 
depicts the difference in that sector's average PD, weighted by the number of borrowers, over a three-year horizon between a trend-based baseline 
scenario (under which no measures are applied) and adverse scenarios resulting from different extensions of the CO2 emission allowances trading 
scheme. See Box 3.1 for further details.
b This adverse scenario considers an increase in CO2 emission allowance prices from €25 to €100.
c This adverse scenario considers a combination of the scenario described in (b) and an extension of the requirement for allowances to other productive 
sectors and to households.
d The bars show the difference in the ratio of profit after tax to RWAs between the corresponding scenario and the baseline scenario, for each of the 
three groups of institutions.
e The effects of the transition costs are calculated under four alternative scenarios. The first scenario, “emissions price increase”, considers an increase in 
CO2 emission allowance prices from €25 to €100. The second scenario, “extension of ETS coverage”, considers the extension of the ETS coverage to 
all firms. The “combination” scenario simultaneously considers the CO2 emission allowance price increase and the extension of the ETS coverage to all 
firms. Lastly, the “combination including extension to households” considers the ETS coverage also being extended to households.
f To calculate the ratio, the numerator (profit after tax) is cumulative for the three years in the exercise, while the denominator reflects the value of 



















EFFECT OF TRANSITION COSTS ON THE RATIO OF PROFIT AFTER TAX TO 
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IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS ON THE BANKING SECTOR (cont’d)
vis-à-vis the baseline scenario is presented for three groups 
of institutions: Spanish institutions directly supervised by the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) that have significant 
international activity (International SIs), the rest of the 
institutions supervised directly by the SSM (Other SIs) 
and institutions supervised directly by the Banco de 
España (LSIs). The emissions price increase has a larger 
impact for the three groups than the extension of ETS 
coverage, with the worst deterioration in smaller institutions 
with no significant international presence, as the scenario 
analysed only considers policy changes in Spain. Insofar as 
the emission allowance scheme is also implemented in other 
jurisdictions, the impact on International SIs’ profitability can 
be expected to be more similar to that for the other groups.5 
Under the scenario that combines both effects, the differences 
in terms of profit generation as a percentage of RWAs are 
-0.16 pp, -0.31 pp and -0.35 pp for the three groups of 
institutions, respectively. If the extension of ETS coverage to 
households is also included, the declines with respect to the 
baseline scenario stand at -0.19 pp, -0.41 pp and -0.41 pp, 
respectively. In terms of ROE,6 the difference in the adverse 
scenarios compared with the baseline scenario for the 
aggregate of institutions (i.e. all three groups) would be in a 
range of between approximately 0.9 pp and 1.5 pp. The 
institutions would not incur significant capital charges under 
any of the scenarios, which shows that the transition costs 
can be considered acceptable.
If the transition to a more sustainable economy is not 
completed or carried out in time, climate change will lead 
to the materialisation of physical risks. These can be 
expected to have potentially much stronger implications 
for the economy, the financial sector and society as a 
whole than those estimated in respect of transition risks 
in the first part of this box. Should climate change occur, 
the environmental fallout of a temperature rise 
(desertification, floods, fires, rising sea levels, etc.) would 
generate asset losses for institutions through various 
channels, in particular in respect of exposures subject to 
credit, market or operational risks.
Quantification of this risk is currently at an incipient stage 
owing to the challenges it poses: uncertainty about the 
future emissions and temperature trajectories, limited 
data, and forecast horizons that are much longer than 
usual, requiring new methodological developments,7 as it 
is normally assumed that, in such long time frames, agents 
will react. Nevertheless, studying physical risk is 
unavoidable in order to understand and assess the future 
effects that climate change could have on the financial 
system if no action to adopt measures is taken. 
To illustrate the possible impact of physical risk, a 
simplified example of the effect on credit risk is presented 
below. For this purpose, the NGFS long-term risk 
scenarios have been considered.8 These scenarios reflect 
transition risk and also physical risk, especially in the 
later years of the horizon. They consider a horizon up to 
2070 and two pathways: an Orderly Transition scenario, 
where the shift to a net-zero emission economy is swift 
and effective (similar to that considered in the previous 
exercise), and a Hot House World scenario, where no 
measures are applied and environmental degradation is 
therefore pronounced. A statistical model was then 
constructed for the aggregate 12-month PDs for 
households and for firms, and the two figures were 
projected up to 2070 under each scenario.9
Chart 4 depicts the difference in annual GDP growth under 
the scenario with larger materialization of physical risks 
(Hot House World) with respect to the Orderly Transition 
scenario. At the start of the pathway, when the transition 
costs predominate over physical costs, the difference is 
slightly positive, but the trend reverses in the longer term 
when the environmental costs of inaction materialise to 
their full extent. By 2070 annual GDP growth under the 
Hot House World scenario is 2.1 pp lower than under the 
Orderly Transition scenario. In the long term, physical 
risks would thus entail a high deterioration in activity, far 
exceeding the cost of the Orderly Transition. 
 5	 	By	construction,	the	scenarios	exclude	these	costs,	as	they	derive	from	a	closed	economy	model	(where	the	Spanish	economy	does	not	have	an	
external	sector).
 6	 	ROE	has	been	estimated	as	accumulated	 three-year	profit	after	 tax	as	a	percentage	of	average	equity	 in	 the	same	period.	Equity	 is	estimated	
assuming	a	trajectory	proportional	to	that	of	RWAs.







BANCO DE ESPAÑA 111 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, AUTUM 2021  3. SYSTEMIC RISK AND PRUDENTIAL POLICY
Box	3.1
IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS ON THE BANKING SECTOR (cont’d)
Chart 5 shows the difference in the projected PD paths for 
households and firms under each scenario, in the same 
terms as in Chart 4.10 Similar to the case of GDP growth, at 
the start of the pathway, credit default risk is somewhat 
higher under the Orderly Transition scenario (as reflected in 
the previous exercise) but, in the longer term, this situation is 
reversed owing to the materialisation of physical risk, and 
much higher probabilities of default are observed in the Hot 
House World scenario. In 2070 the PD for households is 0.57 
pp higher under the Hot House World scenario than under 
the Orderly Transition scenario, with this difference increasing 
to 1.11 pp for firms. Even if these differences could be 
interpreted as being contained in marginal terms, they are 
relevant since they reflect permanent deteriorations in credit 
quality, which have a significant impact when accumulated 
over the life of the loan. 
These findings show that ignoring the costs of the 
materialisation of climate change would lead to an 
underestimation of the costs of credit risk, and that investing 
in an orderly transition is clearly favourable in the medium and 
long run, in terms of mitigating economic and financial risks.
Despite its simplifications, this second exercise is useful 
for highlighting that, depending on how swiftly and 
intensely the transition to a net-zero emission economy is 
carried out, the long-term economic deterioration caused 
by the effects of climate change could have a significant 
and sustained impact on credit quality. The economic 
authorities, including the Banco de España, are working to 
overcome the aforementioned methodological challenges 
and have begun to develop regulatory frameworks for data 
collection, analyses and tools to improve the measurement 
and modelling of its impact.
SOURCES: NGFS and Banco de España.
a Differences in the Hot House World scenario with respect to the Orderly Transition scenario. 
Chart 5
DIFFERENCES IN PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT (a)
Households (left) and firms (right)
Chart 4
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